competition law scrutiny. 4 While the early case law and regulations adopted in the field focused primarily on restrictions of intra-brand competition, 5 and condemned many contractual clauses per se, regardless of their actual effects, 6 a more liberal, and economic approach was introduced with the promulgation of Regulation 2790/1999. 7 For a long time, legal and economic studies had indeed cast light on the fact that vertical agreements had virtually as many pro-competitive effects as anti-competitive ones. 8 Following one of the most vociferous debates in the history of EU competition law, 9 a consensus emerged regarding the fact that competition authorities ought to focus on cases raising real competition concerns i.e. those where inter-brand competition (between competing goods or services) is actually hampered, so that any further restriction of intra-brand competition becomes problematic. Vertical restraints on tight oligopolistic markets were a case in point. On those markets, which are prone to collusive outcomes, competition between suppliers tends to be weak.
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In response to this, the Commission initiated studies in 1997 with a view to reforming the law of vertical agreements. 11 This process culminated in 1999 with the adoption of block exemption Regulation 2790/1999. The new legal framework, which represented 4 A vertical agreement is defined in Article 1(1)(a) of Regulation 330/2010 as covering: "an agreement or concerted practice entered into between two or more undertakings each of which operates, for the purposes of the agreement or the concerted practice, at a different level of the production or distribution chain, and relating to the conditions under which the parties may purchase, sell or resell certain goods or services". According to Article (1)(1)(b) of the Regulation a "vertical restraint" means a restriction of competition in a vertical agreement falling within the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU -see Commission Regulation 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices (2010) OJ L 102 ("the Regulation"). 5 A large number of contractual clauses that hampered competition between distributors of the same good or service (territorial exclusivity etc) were thus prohibited. 6 During this early period, and for a considerable length of time thereafter, the analysis of vertical agreements was characterised by a distinct absence of a real and substantive nexus between law and economic analysis. Agreements between parties that did not enjoy market power could thus be prohibited by the Commission without any meaningful economic analysis being performed to substantiate such findings. a radical departure from the previous approach, 12 rested on a basic economic premise:
the ability of a vertical agreement to produce anti-competitive effects hinges predominantly on the market power of the parties to the agreement (especially the supplier's market share, which reveals the degree of inter-brand competition). In turn, the system instituted a safe-harbour mechanism whereby any agreement between parties holding less than a predetermined "market share" (and which observed a (shorter) list of black clauses and conditions) could be presumed to benefit from an exemption under what is now Article 101(3) TFEU. 13 Above the relevant market share threshold, a full assessment, known as an "individual assessment", needed to be carried out in the light of the principles mentioned in a set of complementary Guidelines. 14 In addition, the new legal framework also governed Internet distribution, which was not covered previously. 
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Against this background the purpose of this study is provide an overview of the new legal regime applicable to vertical agreements. To this end, it is divided in five sections. Following this introduction, section II sets out the different types of vertical restraint and the theories of competitive harm ascribed to them. Section III offers a step-by-step overview of the method that should be followed by agencies, firms and their counsels with a view to self assessing -in the post notification era -vertical 12 And more generally, marks the beginning of the "effects-based" approach in EU competition enforcement. 13 From a legal practitioner's point of view it may have been somewhat disappointing to see that the convenient lists of black, grey and white clauses applicable under the former regime had disappeared. In addition, notwithstanding the simplified regime resulting from the disappearance of a multitude of texts applicable to distribution agreements, legal practitioners viewed the reform as somewhat disconcerting as the new texts borrowed heavily from the nebulous jargon of industrial economics -witness the terms now used such as "market share", "foreclosure effects", "economies of scale", etc. 14 See Commission notice -Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (2010) OJ C 130/1 ("the Guidelines"), para. 96. 15 With the Internet's rapid development and easy accessibility it became imperative to review the system of control of independent distribution agreements in order to align it with commercial realities. 16 See supra notes 4 and 14.
agreements under EU competition law. Section IV deals with the issue of online distribution, which sparked intense controversy during the stakeholder consultation process. Finally, a brief conclusion is provided in section V.
II. TYPES OF VERTICAL RESTRAINT

THE ISSUE
With the paradigmatic shift towards an economic approach in 1999, and its confirmation in the recently adopted texts, EU law has migrated from a "form-based approach" to a so-called "effects-based approach". Pursuant to Regulation 330/2010 and the Guidelines, the nub of the matter is to determine whether a vertical agreement (or part of it), has actual or potential anti-competitive effects that are not outweighed by pro-competitive effects (or objective justifications).
Within the new regulatory framework, six groups of vertical restraint, with distinct possible anticompetitive effects, can be distinguished. 17 In line with the way economists work, the Guidelines ascribe one or more theories of competitive harm to each of these types of restriction and identify their possible countervailing objective justifications as well as pro-competitive effects.
THE EXCLUSIVE CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP GROUP
Notion of exclusive contractual relationships
In an exclusive contractual relationship, a party to a vertical agreement relinquishes its freedom to contract with a third party. Its most drastic variant can be found in "single branding" arrangements, which limit a buyer's ability to buy, resell or use as inputs competing goods or services. 18 Less extreme declinations of exclusive 17 The Guidelines also devote some space to other types of vertical restraints, such as franchising at paras. 189-191 and tying at paras. 214-222 . These issues will not be dealt with in the present paper. 18 The idea here is to prevent the buyer from supplying itself with products of another brand. See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 129. Exclusive purchasing leads to a similar result but, as will be seen later, it responds to a significantly distinct definition. This explains why the Commission mentions exclusive purchasing in the same breath as vertical restrictions belonging to the contractual relationships include quantity forcing, 19 conditional rebate schemes, twopart tariffs (fixed fee plus a price per unit), tying arrangements (where the sale of one product is conditional upon the purchase of another), 20 or any other clauses (e.g.
"English clauses") 21 or penalties which render more rigid the supplier/buyer relationship by encouraging the buyer to concentrate its purchases of goods or services with its customary supplier.
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The Van den Bergh Foods case is a good illustration of an exclusive contractual relationship. 23 A supplier of "impulse" ice cream had made freezers available to its
Irish distributors for free. In return, the distributors were contractually required to refrain from storing other brands of ice cream in those freezers.
An exclusive contractual relationship may also appear in the context of exclusive supply arrangements. Here, the supplier is obliged (or incentivized) to sell the contractual goods or services only (or mainly) to one buyer, in general or for a particular use. 
Theories of competitive harm
Drawing on economic theory, the Guidelines ascribe three theories of competitive harm to exclusive contractual relations, namely foreclosure, collusion, and reduced consumer choice. First, exclusive contracts may foreclose competitors' access to outlets (in the case of single branding or long-term contracts, for example) or inputs (in the case of exclusive supply, for example). In a market subject to widespread single branding arrangements, a new supplier willing to enter the market has no other exclusive distribution group. The concept of a non-compete obligation would appear to cover both single branding and exclusive purchasing. Second, in some sectors which often involve branded or positional goods/services, exclusive contractual relationships limit "certification of free-rider" issues. A manufacturer willing to introduce a new "premium" product/service indeed needs to sell primarily through retailers whose reputation is to stock only 'quality' products. If the manufacturer does not limit its sales to such premium stores, its product/service may be undervalued by customers, and its marketing strategy may be put into jeopardy. To convince 'premium' stores to sell the premium product, manufacturers may thus have recourse -at least for a certain period of time -to exclusive contractual relationships (such as exclusive supply, etc.).
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Third, exclusive contractual relationships are often said to solve "hold up" issues.
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Such issues arise when a buyer makes a "specific" investment as consideration for the performance of a vertical contract (an oil refinery builds a pipeline linking its facilities to those of a particular oil supplier). The investment is "specific", because apart from the particular contractual relationship, it has no other value. It is, as economists would say, a "sunk cost". Hostage of its own investments, the buyer endsup locked into a commercial relationship with the supplier and its product, and at the mercy of its bargaining power (the supplier may for instance engage in opportunistic Those services come, however, at a cost, which in turn translates into higher prices.
Distributors providing such services are thus vulnerable to the risk that consumers select a product within their point of sale, but subsequently purchase it from a different distributor who offers a more attractive price (precisely because it has incurred similar costs in pre and post-sales services).
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To maintain retailers' incentives to invest in pre-and post-sales services, and avoid this free-rider problem, suppliers may grant territorial protection, customer exclusivity, or enter into an exclusive supply commitment. More generally, such contractual protection is equally useful when a distributor must make an "initial investment" on a new market, 54 undertake "promotional efforts", 55 or when it has a certain reputation for quality on the market. Finally, some types of limited distribution arrangements, and in particular selective distribution, allow suppliers to prevent "principal-agent" problems. Some retailers subject to competition may neglect quality of service ex post, and in turn harm the uniform reputation/brand image of the suppliers' good. To alleviate such concerns, suppliers may apply ex ante selection systems (selective distribution), 60 or contractually require that the distributors comply with a list of specifications in terms of know-how and image they wish to convey (franchising).
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basis to secure the loan. The buyer or supplier may have better information and be able, through an exclusive relationship, to obtain extra security for its investment. Where the supplier provides the loan to the buyer, this may lead to non-compete or quantity forcing on the buyer. Where the buyer provides the loan to the supplier, this may be the reason for exclusive supply or quantity forcing vis-à-vis the supplier. See Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 107(h). 56 See Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 107(c), referring to the "certification free-rider issue". 57 See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 107(g). 58 See J. Tirole, supra note 8, p.193. 59 See V. Korah and D. O'Sullivan, supra note 25, p.37, noting that such considerations were at the heart of the old laws which have since been abolished. 60 See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 174. 61 In this type of distribution network, it is common to prohibit the resale of goods/services to unauthorized distributors outside of the network.
THE MARKET-SHARING GROUP
Notion of market sharing
Put simply, in a market sharing arrangement, a supplier restricts the venues where its buyers can purchase or sell contractual goods/services.
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A first form of market sharing is exclusive purchasing. 63 Here, a buyer commits to purchase exclusively from one particular supplier (for example, from a regional wholesaler) in order to meet its requirements of a given product/service. In contrast, the buyer cannot purchase from other suppliers of the same product (other wholesalers in other geographical regions).
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A second conventional form of market sharing involves the resale side of the market, and often arises in the context of exclusive distribution systems (where each buyer is primarily responsible for the resale of the product/service on a given territory/to a designated type of customer). 65 There is market sharing when a supplier restricts its distributors' freedom to resell outside the assigned territory/designated customer base. 66 In this context, a distinction is usually drawn between restrictions of "active sales" (the buyer cannot actively solicit customers outside its territory) 67 and restrictions of "passive sales" (the buyer cannot meet unsolicited orders from customers outside its territory).
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Market sharing is polymorphous. In its purest form, a contractual clause may directly forbid the resale of products/services outside the relevant territory (or designated type of customer). Alternatively, the supplier may use indirect incentives (financial rewards or penalties) to encourage distributors to confine their deliveries to their assigned territory/customer base.
The Nintendo case provides a good illustration of unlawful market-sharing. In a 2002 decision, the Commission found that Nintendo and several of its EU distributors had colluded to artificially keep high price differentials across several Member States.
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Under the collusive arrangement, each distributor was required to prevent parallel trade from its territory to other territories (parallel trade involves exports from low price countries to high price countries). 70 In practice, Nintendo and several distributors had taken active steps to stem parallel trade. Distributors that had allowed parallel exports were punished through supply reductions (or even boycott). As a result of such conduct, the Commission meted out a €167.8 million fine on Nintendo and seven of its official distributors.
Theories of competitive harm
In a market sharing system, each buyer enjoys a monopoly over the resale of a product/service to a particular territory/type of customer. Intra-brand competition is thus entirely eliminated. If the degree of inter-brand competition is limited, each 68 'Passive' sales mean responding to unsolicited requests from individual customers including delivery of goods or services to such customers. General advertising or promotion that reaches customers in other distributors' (exclusive) territories or customer groups but which is a reasonable way to reach customers outside those territories or customer groups, for instance to reach customers in one's own territory, are considered passive selling. General advertising or promotion is considered a reasonable way to reach such customers if it would be attractive for the buyer to undertake these investments also if they would not reach customers in other distributors' (exclusive) territories or customer groups -see the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. buyer thus enjoys "significant market power" (the ability to raise prices significantly and durably above the competitive level).
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In addition, market sharing is likely to thwart the integration of the Internal Market, when resale restrictions partition markets along national lines. In this variant, differentiated prices will prevail across Member States. This goes against the philosophy of EU market integration, which seeks to ensure homogeneous conditions for customers across the EU.
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Finally, market sharing facilitates collusion. With market sharing, a buyer's price cuts do not generate larger sales. Hence, buyers' incentives to deviate from a tacit or explicit collusive equilibrium are limited.
Objective justifications and pro-competitive effects
Even more clearly than exclusive distribution, market sharing eradicates free-rider issues, and may thus encourage buyers to invest in pre-and post-sales services.
Importantly, such systems are often imposed by suppliers on -possibly reluctantbuyers who are prone to compete aggressively on price at the expense of quality. In this context the Guidelines delve into unknown territory by turning buyer power into theories of competitive harm. The Guidelines seek in particular to offer guidance on two novel areas, namely upfront access payments (i.e., payment of fixed fees by suppliers to retailers in order to gain access to their shelf space -known as slotting allowances) and category management agreements (i.e. agreements where the distributor entrusts a given supplier -a "category captain" -with the marketing of a category of products, which include rival products).
Such issues have, however, been dealt with at Member State level. In the United Kingdom, for example, the Office of Fair Trading in the anticipated acquisition by United Biscuits (UK) Limited of the Jacobs Bakery Limited has recently grappled with the issue of category management. In this case, some competitors raised concerns about the power of the merged firm to further its own sales at the expense of those of its rivals using its control over the supermarkets through the category management process. In the context of this merger, the OFT did not, however, expect a retailer (particularly a major supermarket chain) to permit itself to be disadvantaged by its choice of category manager, or adherence to its recommendations. payments are likely to increase the price charged by the supplier for the contract products since the supplier must cover the expense of those payments. In turn, and without much explanation in relation to the collusion issue, the Guidelines consider that these higher supply prices may reduce retailers' incentives to compete on price downstream, while the profits of distributors are increased as a result of access payments.
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According to the Commission category management agreements generally do not raise competition law concerns. Yet, they may occasionally lead to the foreclosure of other suppliers "where the category captain is able to limit or disadvantage the distribution of products of competing suppliers". 80 In addition, such agreements may facilitate collusion between distributors when the same supplier serves as a category captain for all or most of the competing distributors on a market. In a rather terse manner, the Guidelines state that in such cases the category captain will provide a payments are a risk sharing mechanism, which limits the risk that suppliers will launch suboptimal products at the expense of buyers.
As far as category management agreements are concerned, the Commission considers that they may allow distributors to have access to the supplier's marketing expertise for a certain group of products. In particular, since such agreements are based on customers' habits, they lead to increased customer satisfaction by satisfying demand expectations. Put simply, they ensure that the optimal quantity of products is presented directly on the shelves in a timely manner.
84 Moreover, such agreements generate costs economies for the buyer, which outsources the management of a category of products to a supplier. Finally, category management agreements generate economies of scale, as the cost of managing a category of products is merely incurred once (by the category captain), and can be spread over a wide range of products.
III. A STEP-BY-STEP METHOD FOR THE SELF-ASSESSMENT OF VERTICAL RESTRICTIONS
With the increased risks stemming from the enforcement of the EU competition rules (i.e., swingeing fines, annulment and damages actions, negative reputation, etc.), firms should regularly self-assess vertical agreements through the lenses of Article 101 TFEU. Regulation and the Guidelines establish two sets of presumptions, which from the outset permit one to ascertain whether or not their purported vertical agreement falls foul of the EU competition rules. Pursuant to those texts, parties to a vertical agreement must first verify whether their purported agreement falls within the presumption of incompatibility provided for in Article 4 of the Regulation (1.1).
Vertical agreements which fall outside this presumption of incompatibility may in turn be presumed compatible with Article 101 TFEU, if certain conditions defined in the Regulation and the Guidelines are fulfilled (1.2). As will be seen below, only those vertical agreements that do not benefit from those presumptions are subject to a full-blown individual competition analysis.
1.1. The presumption of incompatibility
Preliminary remarks
88 See Article 2(1) of the Regulation, supra note 4. We therefore do not discuss agreements that fall outside the scope of the Regulation and the Guidelines i.e. (i) agreements between competing firms (with the exception of section 2(4) of the Regulation on non-reciprocal vertical agreements), (ii) agreements concluded within the framework of an association of retailers of goods (other than section 2(2) relating to relations between the association and its members), (iii) vertical agreements falling within a specific block exemption (see Article 2(5) of the Regulation), such as motor vehicle distribution agreements, (iv) agreements pertaining to leases and rental agreements (see the Guidelines, supra note , para. 26). We also exclude real agency contracts. A "real" agency contract does not fall within the purview of Article 101(1) TFEU. A "false" agency contract does on the other hand fall within the ambit of Article 101 TFEU. The dividing line between these two types of contract is drawn by reference to the criterion of imputability of financial and commercial risks associated with the contract. A real agency contract is one by which the agent bears no financial risk. Conversely, a false agency contract is a contract where the financial risk and the risks associated with the non-performance of contractual obligations is imputed to the agent. See the Guidelines, supra note 14, paras. 13-16. Article 101(1) TFEU is applicable to agency contracts when the agent assumes one or more of the following risks: the agent contributes to the costs associated with the supply of the goods or services (e.g. transport costs), the agent invests in promotional activities, the agent sets up and operates at its own expense an after-sales service or warranty system, the agent makes market-specific investments in equipment, facilities or staff training; the agent assumes liability vis-à-vis third parties for products sold, the agent assumes responsibility for the non performance of the contract by the customer etc. 89 See F. Wijckmans et al., supra note 11, para. 1.52.
Article 4 of the Regulation sets down a list of five "hardcore restrictions", (sometimes referred to as "black clauses") whose presence in a vertical agreement ipso jure leads to (i) a presumption that the agreement as a whole restricts competition within the meaning of Article 101 (1) :first, suppliers seek to protect themselves against the risk that distributors engage in a race to the bottom in terms of prices and may neglect the quality of service provided in order to make costs savings. On this point, the Chicago authors recognise that control of resale prices eliminates price competition. However, such systems do lead to competition on other equally crucial parameters. Second, suppliers sometimes seek to protect the brand image of their products (luxury goods industry, for example) from the risk that such goods are sold at rock-bottom prices. Third, suppliers impose resale prices in order to increase the density of their distribution network. Achieving density (i.e. the setting up of a significant number of points of sale) is expensive. Relevant costs are compensated by setting minimum prices which guarantees a minimum profit for distributors in the absence of which they would not distribute a given product for want of sufficiently extensive territorial coverage. Fourth, resale price maintenance is a means, for a new entrant, to persuade a distributor to market its products by offsetting the latter's investment risks. Fifth, resale price maintenance can ensure that distributors make significant profits. 
Restrictions on active and passive sales in selective distribution networks
The third hardcore restriction concerns selective distribution agreements. Pursuant to Article 4(c) of the Regulation, suppliers cannot restrict the territories/customers (in)to which selective distributors may sell to end-users. 121 This presumption of incompatibility covers both active and passive sales. It thus goes further than the hardcore restriction enshrined in Article 4(b).
Contrary to a common misconception, Article 4(c) does not forbid exclusivo-selective distribution networks. Suppliers can freely select distributors, and assign to them specific territories/customers (which means that suppliers will not sell products/services to other distributors within the same territory/customer base).
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What is incompatible is to limit selective distributors' ability to make active or passive sales to end-users located within the territory of other selective distributors.
Similarly, suppliers can impose a restriction on the dealer's freedom to determine the location of its business premises. 123 This latter possibility permits suppliers to significantly impede the ability of pure Internet players (those without a physical infrastructure) to join a selective distribution network.
Restrictions of cross-deliveries in selective distribution networks
The fourth hardcore restriction also concerns selective distribution agreements. 
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In practice, an analysis of "substitutability" must be undertaken to delineate product and geographic markets. To this end, the most conventional technique consists in simulating the effect of a small, but significant and non-transitory increase in prices (5-10%) on the demand for the product (the so-called "SSNIP test"). If demand shifts to other products and/or neighbouring geographic areas, it can readily be assumed that these products and/or neighbouring geographic areas belong to a same relevant market.
Despite its apparent simplicity, the definition of the relevant market is far from being an exact science. To take again our example above, how can one say with certainty whether Coca-Cola operates on the wholesale market for soft drinks, rather than on the wholesale market for carbonated soft drinks with a cola flavour? Of course, practitioners generally find assistance in decisional precedents, and in particular in the numerous decisions adopted by the Commission under the EU Merger Regulation.
That being said, a large number of markets still remain to be defined by competition authorities.
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Moreover, the calculation of the market shares poses a significant challenge. To compute market shares, parties need data on the total sales (for the supplier) and purchases (for the buyer) achieved on the relevant market. 137 In principle, however, such data is unavailable to the parties, which do not -and should not -know the 
Block exemption mechanism
The third presumption of compatibility is the main feature of Regulation 330/2010.
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Vertical agreements which observe a dual set of market share thresholds (a), as well as a range of conditions (b) are deemed to automatically fulfil the conditions for the application of Article 101(3) TFEU. 143 In some exceptional circumstances, the benefit of the block exemption may, however, be withdrawn (c). 144 In the event that the market share exceeds the threshold by 5% at the end of the initial assessment of the agreement, the Regulation (Article 7) provisionally allows the exemption to remain in place. If the market share is less than 35%, the agreement can benefit from the exemption for a period of two years. If the market share is greater than 35%, the exemption is only valid for one year. 145 Under the legal regime in place under Regulation 2790/1999 the 30% market share rule generally only applied to the supplier (except in cases of exclusive supply). 146 The term "safe harbour" is borrowed from the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 23. 147 It is open to debate whether, from an economic point of view, the market-share thresholds constitute an effective screening mechanism for assessing vertical agreements. The market share thresholds are based on a structural reasoning, which borrows heavily from the teachings of the Harvard School (in particular, the SCP correlation between market share, market power and supracompetitive prices). For an illustration of such structuralism see recital 4 of the preamble to the Regulation, supra note 4, which states that an individual assessment requires that "account [be] taken of several factors, and in particular the market structure on the supply and purchase side". In a market of differentiated products (economists speak of monopolistic competition), market shares below 30% are not incompatible with the existence of significant market power. Moreover, it is open to question whether a rule based on the market shares held by the parties is really that effective for assessing the risks of oligopolistic tacit collusion. In fact, tacit collusion is a rare economic phenomenon which requires that -in addition to the presence of a tight oligopoly-4 cumulative conditions be met: mutual understanding of the terms of coordination (C1), detection of any risks of deviation (C2), the existence of a retaliatory mechanism (C3) and an absence of any challenge by forces that are exogenous to the oligopoly (C4). The issue of market share held by each party is of no particular importance. A situation of oligopolistic tacit collusion is indeed possible below the relevant thresholds. On the other hand, even in cases above the relevant thresholds it is possible that there is no risk of tacit collusion -if one of the conditions is not satisfied (C1 and C2, for example, where the market is not transparent). One may therefore agreement, and in particular small ones, enjoy sufficient expertise to undertake the intricate industrial economics exercises (market definition and market share calculation) prescribed under Regulation 330/2010.
In substance, the reason behind the introduction of an additional market share threshold is predicated upon a variant of "buyer power" (or monopsony) theory. As explained previously, in mainstream competition economics, buyer power is primarily viewed as a welfare-enhancing factor, which mitigates the effects of significant market power, 148 to the direct benefit of end consumers (particularly so when the buyer is a retailer purchase prices, payment of listing fees or other (non) price advantages (upfront access payments). Under the previous Regulation, such agreements automatically benefited from a presumptive exemption as long as the supplier's market share did not exceed 30%. To bring such agreements under in-depth competition law scrutiny, the new texts introduce an additional buyer's market share threshold. Only those agreements in which the buyer's market share remains below 30% are presumed to fulfil the Article 101(3) TFEU conditions. Other agreements, which possibly give rise to anticompetitive buyer power, must be subject to a full-blown, individual assessment. In other words, the new Regulation entails an extension of the substantive scope of EU competition law to new categories of agreements. This is further confirmed by the various new sections -discussed above-of the Guidelines devoted to up-front access payments and category management agreements.
That being said, the economic theory of buyer power is far from settled. 151 As indicated previously, since the works of J.K. Galbraith, mainstream economic theory views buyer power as a "countervailing" factor, which leads generally to lower resale prices. In a recent study, E. Pfister asserts that "invariably, buyer power is considered a factor of competitive strength". 152 In contrast, the main theories of harm associated with buyer power -albeit intuitively and theoretically valid-have not been confirmed empirically.
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Moreover, those theories of harm often seem predicated upon disputable assumptions.
With respect to category management agreements, for instance, the Guidelines state that they may result in anti-competitive foreclosure of other suppliers where the category captain is able to limit or disadvantage the distribution of products of competing suppliers. the foreclosure of rival upstream suppliers. 155 A retailer has no interest in a limitation of upstream distribution, which will translate into increased input prices. Rather, the retailer, which strives to offer lower prices to end users, may simply use a category management scheme as an incentive device, to stimulate price competition amongst suppliers. In this setting, the retailer will appoint as the category captain the supplier which grants the largest price reductions. As long as equally efficient rival suppliers can compete for shelf management with the category captain, there is no foreclosure concern.
156 Finally, the fact that additional market shares must be calculated raises a practical, informational problem. Each party only enjoys "perfect" information on its own market share (but not on the other's). Of course, the parties can exchange information on their market shares. Yet, one cannot guarantee that the exchanged information is accurate. In this context, economic theory shows that in situations of information asymmetry, "moral hazard" issues may arise. A retailer willing to conclude -or maintain -a vertical agreement at all costs may, for example, be tempted to share incorrect information with its potential supplier. 157 In such case, however, both parties, including the one which acts honestly, may be held liable for infringing Article 101(1) TFEU.
Because -from a legal policy perspective -normative standards ought to ideally be based on robust economic evidence, it would arguably have been wiser to (i) maintain the simple market share threshold of Regulation 2790/1999 for all agreements; and (ii) provide, exceptionally, that when -in certain sectors -buyer power is likely to give rise to anti-competitive effects (through the exploitation of suppliers, for instance), the Commission and National Competition Authorities ("NCAs") can withdraw the benefit of the block exemption. In contrast, there may well be exploitation concerns. However, competition authorities across the EU often consider that such risks should not be dealt with as a matter of priority. 157 Besides which, the system envisaged by the Regulation leads to an increased flow of commercially sensitive information at the distribution stage insofar as the distributor must, in order to determine its market share, know how much sales are made by its competitors. 158 Under the former system, if the manufacturer held a market share below 30% -but the market share held by the distributor was above this threshold -the Commission had to use the individual withdrawal mechanism and was required to satisfy the heavy burden of proof for the application of Article 101(1) TFEU. The introduction of a 30% market share threshold in relation to b). Conditions
All agreements devoid of hardcore restrictions and which observe the double marketshare threshold are deemed compatible with Article 101 TFEU. 159 That said, however, the parties' contractual freedom is not absolute. Article 5 of Regulation 3320/2010 identifies three types of restraint which occasionally appear in vertical agreements, and which ought to observe specific conditions. If these conditions are met, the restraint is deemed compatible, and this is the end of the self-assessment. If these conditions are not met, the restraint -and it only -cannot be deemed compatible. It must undergo a full-blown competition analysis. The rest of the agreement remains, however, covered by the presumption of compatibility.
160
Article 5 first targets "direct or indirect non-compete obligations" 161 (i.e. singlebranding clauses and exclusive purchasing obligations). 162 It provides that the block exemption only covers non-compete obligations for a period of no more than 5 years. 163 Any such obligation with an indefinite duration; of more than 5 years; or tacitly renewable beyond a period of 5 years, is excluded from the benefit of the block exemption.
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Second, Article 5 focuses on "clauses prohibiting a buyer, after termination of the agreement, from manufacturing, purchasing, selling or reselling goods or distributors has the effect of freeing the Commission from this burden of proof and allows it to deny the benefit of a block exemption for this type of agreement 159 In such circumstances, the parties can craft their vertical agreement as they see fit 160 The clauses in question are severable from the rest of the agreement. They themselves cannot benefit from the exemption. See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 163 Either its duration does not exceed five years, or its renewal beyond 5 years requires the express consent of both parties. 164 The Regulation provides for a derogation from the maximum duration of 5 years when the contract goods or services are sold from premises and land which the vendor owns. As long as the buyer occupies the premises, a non-compete obligation is justified. See Article 5(2)(a) of the Regulation, supra note 4.
services". 165 Such clauses are in principle not eligible for a block exemption. 166 The
Regulation does, however, provide for an exception to this if the clause is: (i) indispensable to protect know-how transferred by the supplier to the buyer; (ii) limited to the retail outlet from which the buyer has operated during the contract period; and (iii) limited to one year following the expiry of the agreement. In fact, this exception primarily concerns franchising agreements, where the franchisor transfers important trade secrets to the franchisee.
Third, Article 5 excludes from the block exemption clauses which impose "any direct or indirect obligation causing the members of a selective distribution system not to sell the brands of particular competing suppliers". 167 The purpose of this provision is to ensure that suppliers making use of selective distribution schemes do not foreclose access to specific competitors. In other words, the block exemption does not apply to practices which are akin to collective boycott. 168 By contrast, the block exemption covers general non-compete obligations in the context of selective distribution networks. 78. In this situation the Commission is also able to intervene if the case raises a particular interest such as the novelty of the relevant issues (see para. 80). For the purposes of this paper, we take the illustration of a vertical agreement which contains a 3 year single branding clause, and involves a supplier controlling nearly 40% of the relevant market.
Selection of the theories of harm
Not all vertical restraints have a similar effect on competition. Economic theory ascribes specific scenarios of competitive harm to the various types of vertical restraint. A prerequisite of any meticulous self-assessment is therefore to "frame" the analysis by selecting a relevant theory of harm.
As explained previously, the Guidelines provide a useful source of guidance on this.
For each group of vertical restraint, the Guidelines articulate a range of possible theories of harm. To take the example of single branding, the Guidelines particularly mention risks of (i) The same applies to the tied market share. It is important to ascertain whether the point of sale that is foreclosed from rivals constitutes an important sales channel. If a supplier with a 40% market share benefits from a single branding commitment with a customer that accounts for 10% of its sales, the tied market share (i.e. 4% of the relevant market) is relatively limited. It is thus unlikely that the agreement restricts competition. If, however, the customer represents half of the sales of the supplier, the tied market share is much higher (i.e., 20% of the relevant market). Here, the restrictive effect of the agreement is considerably more serious. 198 The debate on this issue started relatively early -even before the formal review process of Regulation 2790/1999 began -when the Competition Commissioner set up in 2008 a roundtable charged with discussing the future of online commerce. The work of the roundtable centred on the question of distribution via the Internet of audiovisual content protected by intellectual property rights (the iTunes case showed that European consumers could not be freely supplied throughout the EU for copyright reasons). However, the roundtable also intended to discuss the online commerce of goods/services which are not protected by such rights. Following the publication of an "Issues paper" containing a list of questions for interested parties, operators active in the sector -whether Internet or physical operators-gave their contribution to the public debate. The majority of the contributions submitted tackled the issue of a possible review of the legal framework laid down by Regulation 2790/1999 and the Guidelines. These comments gave impetus to the debate on the issue of vertical restraints and distribution via the Internet. In the footnotes that follow some of the contributions made by relevant stakeholders during the reform process are alluded to. In the same vein, a supplier may request distributors that use third party platforms to sell their products, to display the logo and brands of the contractual product on the website.
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The Commission also considers as a "hardcore restriction" any obligation which dissuades dealers from using the Internet to reach a greater number (or variety) of customers by imposing criteria for online sales which are not equivalent to those imposed for sales in a brick and mortar shop. 213 Importantly, this does not mean that the criteria for online and offline sales should be uniform. 214 For example, in order to prevent sales to unauthorised dealers, a supplier may place a limit on the quantities sold by its selected dealers to an individual end-user. In such cases, the cap placed on sold quantities may have to be stricter for online sales, if it is easier for unauthorised dealers to obtain products through the Internet. The Guidelines seek to provide guidance on what constitutes a passive and active sale in the online world. As explained previously, the concept of active and passive sales is primarily relevant in relation to exclusive distribution. Suppliers can restrict a distributor's freedom to actively sell products in a territory that has been granted to a different distributor. However, unsolicited, passive sales cannot be restricted.
In principle, the setting up of a website to sell a product is viewed as a passive sale, since it is deemed a reasonable way to allow customers to reach the distributor.
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Surely, the use of a website may have effects beyond the distributor's own territory (or customer group). However, this stems from the technology itself, which allows easy access from everywhere.
The Guidelines provide illustrations of passive online sales. If a customer visits the web site of a distributor and contacts the distributor and if such contact leads to a sale, including delivery, then that sale is considered passive. The same holds true if a customer opts to be kept (automatically) informed by the distributor and this leads to a sale. Finally, the fact that a distributor offers different language options on its website (including languages not used in its territory) does not, of itself, alter the passive nature of the sale.
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Given, therefore, that the Guidelines consider Internet sales to be passive sales, sales via the Internet to another territory (or customer base) cannot be restricted on pain of falling within the presumption of incompatibility set out in Article 4 of the Regulation. In this context, the Guidelines provide four specific examples of hardcore restrictions of passive Internet selling: (i) agreements according to which an (exclusive distributor) is required to prevent customers located in another exclusive territory from viewing its website or to automatically re-route its customers to the manufacturer's or other (exclusive) distributors' websites; 218 (ii) agreements whereby an (exclusive) distributor is required to terminate an Internet transaction if the credit card details reveal an address that is not within his exclusive territory; 219 (iii) agreements which require that the distributor limit its proportion of overall sales made over the internet; 220 and (iv) agreements whereby the buyer pays a higher price for products intended to be resold online ("dual pricing").
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217 See the Guidelines, supra note 14, para. 51 218 See the Guidelines para. 52(a). 219 See the Guidelines para. 52(b). 220 See the Guidelines para. 52(c). However, a supplier may -without limiting the online sales of the distributor -require that the buyer sell at least a certain absolute amount (in value or volume) of the products offline to ensure an efficient operation of its brick and mortar shop. 221 See the Guidelines para. 52(d) and 64. This does not exclude the situation whereby the supplier agrees with the buyer a fixed fee (that is, not a variable fee where the sum increases with the realised offline turnover as this would amount indirectly to dual pricing) to support the latter's offline or online sales efforts. With regard to this latter restriction the Commission does consider, however, that in some specific circumstances such an agreement may fulfil the conditions of Article 101(3). Such circumstances may be present where a manufacturer agrees such dual pricing with its distributors, because selling online leads to substantially higher costs for the manufacturer than offline sales. In this regard the Commission provides an instructive example of a situation in which this may be the case: where offline sales include home installation by the distributor but online sales do not, the latter may lead to more customer complaints and warranty claims for the 2.2.2. In exceptional circumstances, Internet sales may be considered active
The Guidelines merely lay down a presumption that Internet sales are passive. In exceptional cases, Internet sales may be considered active, and can thus be restricted. This is the case, for instance, if a distributor sends emails to consumers located in the exclusive territory of another distributor. Similarly, the Guidelines consider online advertisement specifically addressed to certain customers as a form of active selling to those customers. 222 For instance, territory-based banners on third party websites are active sales into the territory where these banners are shown. 223 Similarly, paying a search engine (or an online advertisement provider) to have advertisements displayed specifically to users in a particular territory is active selling into that territory.
V. CONCLUSION
The present paper has attempted to shed some light on the new EU competition rules governing vertical restraints. Whilst the recently adopted regulatory framework provides some useful guidance on Internet distribution, it remains -to say the leastoptimistic as regards the ability of firms to juggle with complex economic operations, such as market definition and market share computation. In addition, it paints a bleak picture of buyer power, which (i) marks a departure from conventional antitrust economics; and (ii) relies on fragile and untested assumptions. Practice will tell whether those extensions of the EU rules on vertical restraints are to be welcomed.
manufacturer. See also in this context the judgment handed down by the Rechtbank Zutphen, judgment of 8 August 2007, 79005 / HA ZA 06-716. The Dutch court held that a dual pricing scheme pursuant to which a supplier of built-in kitchen equipment offered less attractive pricing conditions to online distributors did not infringe Dutch or EU competition laws. 222 See Guidelines, supra note 14, para 53. 223 In general, efforts to be found specifically in a certain territory or by a certain customer group is active selling into that territory or to that customer group.
